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Jenő Szűcs wrote his essay entitled Sketch on the three regions of Europe in the early 1980s in 
Hungary.
1
 This essay was meant to appear in Bibó Emlékkönyv, a book commemorating István Bibó, 
which was being edited by the illegal opposition. As a result of the controversial relations of the late 
Kádár era, the essay was finally allowed to be published in one of the leading Hungarian journals on 
history, Történelmi Szemle. The Sketch gained popularity and sparked heated debates because it raised 
the question of “Central-Europeanism”. A raised interest in the “Central European problem” was 
present from the late 1970s as a direct consequence of the events taking place in Poland, the birth of 
the regime’s opposition in Hungary, and the slow weakening of the Soviet Union. During these years, 
a historically well-argued opinion emphasising a substantial difference between Central European and 
Eastern European societies would be warmly received in various circles of the opposition. Outlining 
the independent historical development and “occidental” roots of the Central European region 
indirectly questioned cold war borders.  
Szűcs’s essay is instructive because of the concepts of “Europeanism” or “occidentalism” to be 
exact. “Central-Europeanism” and, within this concept, the debates and problems on Hungarian 
history mostly veiled the deeper aspects of the author’s European historical theory. In a wider 
European perspective Szűcs improved the old  “liberty topos” which claims that the history of our 
continent is no other than the fulfillment of liberty. Thus he unintentionally lined up with a stream of 
Western-European self-definition still influential in the post-war era, challenging the almighty class 
war concept of Vulgar Marxists.
2
 His concepts of Western societal evolution constructively unified 
Bibó’s thoughts of “small circles of liberty” and the motifs found in contemporary Western 
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historiography and social science. The concept of Western European “original” traits found in the 
Sketch represents the most important elements of post-war Western European self-definition. 
Although Jenő Szűcs became more and more sceptical towards Marxism by the late 70s, he still 
accepted many Marxist conclusions in this essay. It is mostly because of his affiliation to Marxism 
that his Sketch primarily examines the movements of economic and social structures, often referring to 
Anglo-saxon Marxists Perry Anderson
3
 and Immanuel Wallerstein. At any rate, his approach 
integrates elements of the liberty topos and Weber’s concepts to such an extent that he went far 
beyond the boundaries of “official” Marxist historiography.4 At the time he wrote the Sketch, Szűcs  
had been researching the medieval era for decades. The Middle Ages in the West as a centerpiece of 
his concept was not based on a loose interest in historical and politological theory. In fact, he was 
aware of the actual debates on certain historical questions and he was acquainted with adequate 
philological methods to process historic sources.
5
 
As a conceptual starting point, Szűcs chose István Hajnal’s and István Bibó’s theses on European 
societal development. With reference to these, the Sketch is an attempt to rethink and summarize the 
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 Perry Anderson is regarded as one of the most influential Anglo-Saxon Marxist historians of the 1970s and 
1980s. In his four volume synthesis he attempted to summarize and rethink world history. His independent 
thoughts and brave conclusions not only made him a great Marxist historian but he also provided important 
results to other historians. Anderson believed that a “great theory” is possible and thought that he could bring 
order in a world of complicated correlations by creating a typology, examining their historical function and 
comparing economic, social and political macrostructures. He tried to incorporate Weber’s sociology and post-
war historiography in his works in an unbiassed way, under the aegis of a “creative Marxism” of some sort, 
whereas he distanced himself from the Eastern European vulgarisation and schematic generalisation of Marxist 
philosophy.  
The analysis of the distinctiveness of European historic evolution became the focus of his attention because he 
wanted to prove the importance of ancient and medieval antecedents of early modern European expansionism, 
even though he originated the modern world mostly from the rise of Western European capitalism and 
absolutism. His definitive theses on European history appear in the medieval and early modern section of his 
book. The first volume – Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism (1974) – examines the typical features of the 
ancient and feudal modes of production with a differentiation between Western and Eastern Europe. The second 
volume – Lineages of the Absolutist State (1974) – discusses the importance of modern European state 
development and its variations and draws a conclusion on the typical features of European history. Anderson’s 
final conclusion was that the Middle Ages greatly contributed to the gradual manifestation of liberty in Europe. 
By applying a Marxist structural history Anderson came to the same conclusion as advocates of the European 
liberty topos.  
Anderson, Perry (1974): Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism, NLB, London. Anderson, Perry (1974): 
Lineages of the Absolutist State, NLB, London. Anderson, Perry (1989): Az abszolutista állam, Gondolat, 
Budapest. 
4
 Jenő Szűcs interpreted the partial peripherisation of Central Europe with the notions of Wallerstein’s world-
system theory. He also employed Anderson’s historic views and concepts on feudalism and the role of the early 
modern state. He may have been acquainted with Marc Bloch’s works on the Middle Ages as an experienced 
historian, after examining Anglo-Saxon Marxists (As was told by Academy colleague György Granasztói). He 
was further influenced by mediaevist Walter Ullmann, an Austrian historian who emigrated to the US in the 
1930s and later taught at British universities. 
5
 Szűcs’s synthesis on the Middle Ages – Az utolsó Árpádok – was methodically close to the Annales circle. In 
this book Szűcs tried to prove that the typical features of the Western social model also developed in Hungarian 
society in the course of the 13th century, as it was customary in the “second stage” (Marc Bloch’s expression) of 
the Middle Ages. Thus Az utolsó Árpádok is consistent with the Sketch, emphasising the Western medieval roots 
of the Central European region. Szűcs Jenő (1993): Az utolsó Árpádok, História, MTA Történettudományi 
Intézete, Budapest. 
most important characteristics of occidental societal development. Szűcs assumed that Bibó’s concept 
of the Western model is “looking for the rootlets of ‘democratic social organisation’ and ‘community 
building’ running deep beneath the surface. Everything Bibó highlights – based on Hajnal’s theories – 
about the earliest types (traditional, personal and mutual rights and obligations, the balancing 
structure of the ‘small circles of liberty’ which inhibited the concentration of power and withstood the 
‘brutally utilitarian’ methods of unilateral subjugation…), these are all realistic and important 
elements…”6  
István Hajnal was experimenting with creating a new historiography incorporating sociological 
points of view in the 1930s. His works on Europe contain a considerable amount of original ideas and 
they show a great extent of theoretical sensitivity.
7
 The opposing basic notions of his approach are 
“traditionality” and “rationality”. He attributed a “deep organisation” to traditional societies which 
create artifacts and values and, as he argues, these societies are always being threatened by the crude 
and superficial interests of rational capitalism and political powers. Traditional societies, on the other 
hand, possess greater gravity – China and India are typical examples – but they sharply differ from 
modern capitalism as well as the expansive flexibility of the politically expansionist empires of the 
ancient world and those of Islam. According to Hajnal, Western Europe takes a special place among 
the societies he mentions. The decline of rational ancient capitalism and the fall of the Roman empire 
brought along the prevalence of traditionality in the Middle Ages. Yet, as a result of ancient 
antecedents, the traditional structures of society became more relaxed – tribes and gentes disappeared 
for example – which entailed, along with “deep organisation”, a greater appreciation of “personal 
performance”. This means that medieval traditionality in the West was a special and unique social 
structure which was different from all other structures found in different societies. In the modern age 
the forces of capitalism threaten all traditional societies with disintegration. As an exception, Western 
Europe was able to integrate rational interests into the “deep organisation” of its society.8 
István Hajnal’s picture of Europe represented an individual critique of capitalism which was 
formulated with the help of a historic sociology of “conservative” orientation. His approach recognizes 
the unique features of medieval Western European traditionality compared to other societies. His 
arguments are somewhat schematic when he writes that the political organisational forms of nomadic 
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 Szűcs Jenő (1986): p. 520. 
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 István Hajnal’s historical synthesis with strong medieval foundations: Hajnal István (1936): Az újkor története, 
Egyetemes Történet 3. kötet, Magyar Szemle Társaság, Budapest. Theoretical works in: Hajnal István (1993): 
Technika, művelődés. Tanulmányok, História, MTA Történettudományi Intézete, Budapest 
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 Hajnal substantially changed Max Weber’s concept of rationalism. Separating “traditionality” and “rationality”, 
Hajnal formulated a macro-level historical theory where “rationality” has a negative connotation.  
societies, the expansive flexibility of ancient and Islamic empires and numerous features of European 
capitalism are forms of “brutally utilitarian” subjugation and only traditional societies can withstand 
them. According to Hajnal, before rational capitalism Western Europe was a unique example of the 
co-existing prevalence and balance of traditionality and rationality. 
At this point, Bibó picks up the thread. In his study The sense of European societal evolution 
(1971-72)
9
 he also focuses on the Middle Ages. Bibó concentrated his research mainly on relations 
between various social groups, individuals and the governing power.  While Hajnal approaches the 
opportunity of social organisation and community building from a defensive traditionality, Bibó 
emphasises the freedom and autonomy of certain groups against the central power. Hajnal highlights 
historic and sociological viewpoints and social structures. He thought that with this conceptual 
framework he would be able to explain the uniqueness of European societal evolution. In contrast to 
him, Bibó conducted an analysis on ethics, intellectual history and politology. He regards Christianity 
as a new force coming “externally” into the history of Western Europe. It had a great impact on the 
principles of social organisation and enabled “small circles of liberty” to come into existence.10 Bibó 
believed that beyond a tradition of legal and institutional mechanisms for protecting subjects, 
“Europeanism” also meant a collective moral experience leading to the awareness of human dignity, 
preserved in spite of personal dependence in Western European societies. Christianity impregnated 
power with ethics to such an extent that it still determines European political reflexes.  
To Szűcs, Bibó’s “small circles of liberty” came as a key notion in his analysis. He thought that 
medieval Western Europe incarnated autonomy and legal protection of certain groups in an 
exceptionally unique way. Yet he did not originate the opportunity of this phenomenon from the 
religious and ethical effects of Christianity; instead, he proceeded from an analysis of social 
macrostructures.  In this respect his approach is close to that of Hajnal’s. It is only his aspect and 
terminology which are considerably different. 
According to Szűcs, Western European development after the fall of Rome was not only special 
because it did not produce another empire rendering Western religious and civilizational unity under a 
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 The text is from: Bibó István (1986): Az európai társadalomfejlődés értelme, in: Bibó István: Válogatott 
tanulmányok 3. kötet, Magvető, Budapest, pp. 5-123. 
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 Bibó on the role of Western Christianity in social organization and “small circles of liberty”: “This clergy and 
these monastic orders inherited something from the pragmatism of the Roman spirit, the practical nature of their 
political organisation and law, but it also inherited, in a simplified form, something from the state and society 
concept of St Augustine. In this spirit they meant to transform the various power relations in society to functions, 
tasks and Christian duties. European Christian feudalism was therefore far more than a tight military bondage 
of loyalty between superiors and subordinates. ... this institutionalised system which included society on the 
whole was not merely based on subservience as it included a great deal of liberty – privileges and diets ...” Bibó 
István (1986): p. 34. 
single political centre. Up to this point, the Sketch is of the same opinion as Weber.
11
 But Szűcs argues 
that the ancient societal forms which had once fleshed out the imperial framework disintegrated with a 
unique radicalism. “The first five hundred years in the history of the West is an unusual takeoff for a 
birth of a civilization. It is characterised by disintegration instead of integration. There is an obvious 
civilizational decline in an era of reagrarization and widespread political anarchy.”12 In societies 
outside Europe this special extent of disintegration did not apply, so imperial reflexes always 
triumphed there. Because of this, political organizations in non-European high cultures always 
preserved their “top-down” nature.  
All these societies had three common features: “the status of the groups in power was determined 
by a prebendal – as Max Weber puts it – dependence on public revenues”, and ”the city was the 
centre of both civilian and military government… therefore as a form of settlement it was a mixed 
agglomerate of noblemen with local authority, civilian and military authorities, merchants and 
artisans, and as such, it totally lacked autonomy and legal homogeneity.”13; and, finally, that there 
were hardly any legally autonomous social layers between the prebendal elite and the agrarian 
population. To Szűcs, the theocratic or secular nature of power, the question of a state’s land 
monopoly and the dominance of civilian or military figures in the governing elite are secondary 
characteristics. That is because a political and legal structure can stabilize and reproduce the “top-
down” quality of social and political lines of force independent from these factors. Contrary to models 
outside Europe, the novelty of Western society lies in the impossibility of a “top-down” integration as 
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the effects of varying circumstances in withdrawing urban liberties on the evolution of capitalism. In his opinion, 
“an organized world power swept away urban liberties in the ancient times, and there was no room for political 
capitalism within an empire”. (Weber, Max (1979): Gazdaságtörténet, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 
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capitalism.” (Weber, Max (1979): p. 268.)  The late Roman state became a a strictly centralised bureaucratic 
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In the strengthening states of late medieval Western Europe the autonomy of the cities was also infringed. 
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foundation of modern Western capitalism.” (Weber, Max (1979): p. 269.)  As the states were engaged in fighting 
each other for resources, they could not help fostering and nurturing national capitalisms. An alliance between 
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… until the nation state is replaced by an empire”. (Weber, Max (1979): p. 269.)   
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 Szűcs Jenő (1986): p. 521. 
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 Szűcs Jenő (1986): p. 523. 
a result of deep disintegration, where “integrational lines of force started to develop from the 
bottom…”14 
This “bottom-up” organization was brought along by Feudalism. The Sketch refers to Anderson 
when it gives an emphasis to the fragmentation of sovereignty and the contractual nature of a feudal 
lord-vassal relationship.
15
 He also highlights that relations between a feudal lord and a vassal were 
both subservient and mutual. On the other hand, Szűcs attributes greater importance to medieveal 
liberties than Anderson.
16
 On the whole, Szűcs accepted Anderson’s concept on Feudalism, as the 
conclusion concerning the freedom of social groups and individuals from the centre of power as well 
as their scope of freedom was easy to integrate with Bibó’s concept about the “small circles of 
liberty”.17 Anderson’s statements serve as points of orientation in various questions throughout the 
Sketch. His concepts on Germanic-Roman symbiosis and early modern types of Absolutism as well as 
the more general problem of writing a Marxist structural history in a way that its conclusions lead to a 
version of European liberty definition were all valuable sources for Szűcs. 
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 Szűcs Jenő (1986): p. 525. 
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 Szűcs regarded the 9-10th century as a realization of feudal relations and the fragmentation of sovereignty as a 
starting point of “Western societal evolution”. Therefore he did not think that the Carolingian state was the basis 
of Western European history (Pirenne) or that it was an ending point of emerging medieval structures (Dopsch). 
To him, it was the last stage of early medieval Germanic-ancient parallellism and the “imperial model”: “...The 
Carolingian state cannot be regarded as a feudal state, it is more like a civilizational model which tried to 
integrate inherited and new features, ancient and Frankish institutions: especially slavery and free peasantry. As 
a third element, feudal relations were being born.” “The attempt of the first Carolingians for the political 
synthesis of ancient-barbarian symbiosis can be interpreted as the single Western attempt to follow the reflexes 
of other high cultures and integrate the legacies, that is, connect the notion of ‘civilization’ with ‘imperial’ 
(political) integration. The ‘renewal’ of the Empire in the decades around 800 was nothing else than an attempt 
to revive imperial tradition, preserved by the Roman church, by depleting the reserves of Frankish institutions. 
However, reserves were already depleted by then and the temporary framework was swept away from the bottom 
by a fourth element, feudalism. With this ’civilization’ and ’political structure’ got separated permanently in the 
West.” Makkai László (1986): Az európai feudális rendszer genezise, működése és fejlődése (Jenő Szűcs’s 
comment), MTA TTI - OPI, Budapest, p.16. and Szűcs Jenő (1986): pp. 524-525. 
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 According to Anderson, “the integration of vassal, benefice and immunity into one complex created the 
ambiguous compound of contractual mutuality and subordinated dependence … the oath of fealty and investiture 
obliged both parties to respect certain commitments. The ethos of feudal nobility held together ‘honesty’ and 
‘loyalty’ in a dynamic tension, which was an alien idea to a citizen of the antiquity who … only knew the former, 
and it was no less strange to a subordinate of Turkish sultanism or a similar despotic rule who only knew the 
latter.” Anderson (1989): p.529. Anderson’s feudalism concept also refers to the presence of elements of liberty 
in medieval Western Europe but he did not use the notion of libertas to such an extent as Jenő Szűcs. 
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 Contrary to Szűcs’s interpretation, Hungarian historiography perceives the feudal system as the relation of lord 
and peasant – that is, the role of the feudal economy in organising production. A typical example of this 
restrictive interpretation is found in László Makkai’s feudalism concept. Whether servitium and dominium were 
the only key concepts of feudal structure – Szűcs argues - “depends on whether we talk about Western Europe 
before or after the turn of the millennium. If we talk about the latter stage then we have to include ‘libertas’ in 
the row of social organizers: this is specific to European feudalism. The very essence of vassalage is ‘free 
service’ and they always emphasised freedom when they established a feudal relation. This emphasis does not 
only appear in vassalage but also in the subordination of peasantry: The peasant hands over his land ‘libere’, of 
free will, when he asks protection from a lord. It is not convincing that the lecture explains various phenomena 
with the inner logic of the evolution of feudal estates...” (Jenő Szűcs’s comment on Makkai’s feudalism concept) 
Makkai László (1986): p. 17.  
However, the concept of Feudalism in the Sketch also contains new elements. It attributes key 
importance to the consequence of a total disintegration of central power in which Feudalism 
“substituted ‘state’ with ‘societal’ relations”.18 With this fact, Szűcs discovered a medieval antecedent 
of a modern political thought: the separation of the state and the society. As he writes: “this separation 
is not an endogeneous feature of human history. Naturally, all of the states are built up on a society, 
but the gravity that an evolving state should find its legitimation outside the society, present in high 
cultures for five thousand years, will consequently develop such a structure in which the society will 
appear as a derivative of the state and not the other way round.”19 
Empires with a “top-down” social organization do not separate “society” and “state” too clearly.  
The fall of the Roman empire and emerging feudalism thereafter was a historical event of utmost 
importance because it enabled the centre of sovereignty to slip from the governing circles to the hands 
of the political society as a result of the fragmentation of central power. The bottom-up principles of 
social organization enabled the society to gradually become a legitimational force of the state – not in 
a modern sense of course. This is the reason why the first formulations of such concepts as  “natural 
law, social contract, sovereignty, transfer of power and the separation of the branches of power” 
appeared in medieval universities,”although in a remote and foreign context, anyway, they were not 
considerably less in the focus of political theory in the ’great century’ of the Middle Ages, that is the 
thirteenth, than in the one which was the advent of modern times, that is the eighteenth.” 20 These 
medieval ideas were interesting and understandable for contemporaries because the problems they 
dealt with were present in Western European feudal structures.  
Szűcs argues in favour of the medieval roots of “civil society”. Contrary to Bibó, who associated 
social autonomies and the “small circles of liberty” with the ethical value of human dignity, the Sketch 
employs the typical categories of liberal political philosophies. Szűcs attempted to connect this idea 
with closely linked concepts of feudalism, disintegration and “bottom-up” organisational principles 
and to develop a coherent eurocentric historical approach. When he demonstrates non-European 
societies he relies neither on the analysis by Hajnal nor on the typology of the Asian mode of 
production, instead, he employs renewed categories of Weber’s sociology. This is why he regarded the 
problem of property relations as secondary, whereas he emphasised the importance of the prebendal 
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system
21
 and the lack of urban autonomy in “top-down” societies. So the Sketch writes about societies 
outside Europe in a similar manner as post-war Western social scientists wrote about “empires”.22  
Another important element of Szűcs’s concept of the Middle Ages is the questions of classical 
ancient antecedents and ancient-barbarian symbiosis. In the Sketch the effects of classical ancient 
societies on European development is less prominent than in Perry Anderson’s writing or in some 
cultural historic works on analyzing Christian-ancient syntheses. Anderson took the Germanic-Roman 
symbiosis, the ancient citizen ideal, the municipal heritage and Roman law – that is, legal and 
institutional tradition – as living factors throughout the medieval era. Szűcs, on the other hand, 
emphasised that “the ancient model of autonomous society”, which is Greek polis democracy 
“vanished with the rise of Hellenistic empires just as the Roman republican idea did in an imperial 
dead end. It became a mere fiction. These early historical phenomena did not flow directly into the till 
of European societal evolution .”23 Keeping such a distance from the ancient influence on the Middle 
Ages can be traced back to Szűcs’s firm belief that a historical process is determined predominantly by 
economic and social structures, which belief he held even more consistently than Anderson. While 
Anderson valued the legal and institutional patterns of the “superstructure”, thus allowing that these 
forces – although never religious and spiritual forces – may have been forming structures, Szűcs 
remained within the constraints of economic-social structure analysis – which belongs to the 
“economic-social base” in Marxism.  
Anderson declared the imitation of legal and institutional ancient patterns a significant historical 
factor in the process of ancient-medieval layering. Szűcs thought that the ancient heritage influenced 
the development of the Western model primarily by the deep symbiosis between ancient and barbarian 
social structures. The Sketch argues that early medieval societal evolution “came into existence in 
tension and short term parallelism and fragmented and crushed both state forms. The central power of 
Germanic kingdoms vanished, and so did the imperial institutional system along with Roman law. … 
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 Weber thought that the fall of empire in Western Europe led to feudalisation whereas in the East – particularly 
in India – it led to prebendalisation. “Western feudalism – just like Indian feudalism – sprouted from the 
disintegration of the central power of a patrimonial system. In the West, it was that of the Carolingian empire, in 
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 Paradigmatic elaboration of this is found in: Eisenstadt, Schmuel (1969): The Political Systems of Empires, 
Free Press, New York   
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 Szűcs Jenő (1986): p. 521. 
Germanic gentes … disintegrated just like the remains of the legal society of the Roman populus.” 24 
“Of course this was also an integration of some sort, ancient and barbarian heritage intermixed … but 
this was not an integration of the elements like that of the Islamic world but a more organic merger, so 
that in the ’Dark Centuries’  it seemed that the elements have interfered with each other to such an 
extent that they nearly destroyed each other in the process.”25 
Szűcs’s views on ancient-barbarian symbiosis are key because they suggest that the disintegration 
and fusion of such elements in Western European societies – or rather the unique manner of this fusion 
– enabled the evolution of a social structure different from barbarian tribal societies as well as ancient 
social and political structures before the turn of the millennium. According to the Sketch, “it is exactly 
a total disintegration that brought along this strange type of dynamism, which would then change 
contrasts in the first three centuries of the new millennium”26 contrary to the Byzantine and Islamic 
civilizations. So this unique manner of Germanic-ancient symbiosis gave way to a vigorous medieval 
development of agriculture and urban growth which showed capitalistic features from the 14-15th 
centuries onwards. This leads us to a perception of the Middle Ages as an antecedent of Western 
modernity in many respects – although Szűcs never stated this directly. The Sketch is therefore in 
accordance with the suppositions of Western historiography and social sciences after the World War II 
stating that the late medieval era was a prequel to the modern age.
27
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Szűcs argues that the most important result of Germanic-ancient symbiosis was the disintegration of the tribal 
structure. This thought also appears in Hajnal’s picture of European history. Contrary to Weber, Szűcs does not 
deduce the disintegration of tribal structures from the universality of the Christian faith but from the long-term 
transformation and interaction of Roman and barbarian social structures. Szűcs suggests that the final 
disintegration of tribal structures and the forthcoming feudal relations paved the way to capitalism for 11-13th 
century Western European societies. 
To the disintegration of ancient-barbarian parallellism: “...Roman ‘cosmopolitism’ and ‘Germanic’ ‘gentilism’ 
are opposite phenomena of the late ancient world which became obsolete after a two- or three century long 
transitional period. While the early medieval transition integrated certain elements, at the same time it destroyed 
‘gentilist’ (tribal) structures. Early ‘romanised’ barbarian kingdoms were the first to do so, trying to pull down 
the dualism of Roman and barbarian elements from the top while early feudal relations undermined traditional 
ethnosocial bonds and organizations from the bottom.” “In the Mediterranean and Western parts of Europe 
which were in connection with the ancient world, directly or indirectly, in their genesis, original national frames 
and ethnosociological forms of prefeudal-barbarian (Germanic) structure vanished during the early Middle 
Ages (6-9th centuries), just like the Romans did. After intermixing and complicated procedures of disintegration 
in narrow territorial constraints … in the 9-10th centuries greater political, linguistic and cultural entities, 
nations began to evolve, which were then called ‘gens’ or ‘natio’.” Szűcs interpreted these social structures as 
territorial rather than tribal. Szűcs Jenő (1984): Gentilizmus. A barbár etnikai tudat eredete, in: Szűcs Jenő: 
Nemzet és történelem, Gondolat, Budapest, pp. 344-345, 333-334. 
26
 Szűcs Jenő (1986): p. 522. 
27
A classic elaboration: Rosenstock-Huessy, Eugen (1949): The Driving Power of Western Civilization: the 
Christian Revolution of the Middle Ages, Beacon Press, Boston. Rosenstock-Huessy, Eugen (1951): Die 
europäischen Revolutionen und der Charakter der Nationen, Europa Verlag, Zürich, Wien. Újabban: Fukuyama, 
Francis (2012): A politikai rend eredete, Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest. Chapters on the medieval development of 
Western Europe.    
According to Szűcs, in the course of disintegration of early medieval social forms there was only 
one exception: the Roman Catholic church. Moreover, it was able to strengthen its positions in the 
turmoil following the fall of the Roman empire and it also implemented the doctrine of separating the 
state from the church which went directly against the Byzantine model. This is of key importance 
because “the separation of spiritual and secular as well as ideological and political matters was one 
of those extremely fertile separations of the Western world without which the later ‘liberties’, social 
emancipation, nation states, renaissance and reformation would all have been inconceivable”.28 
Contrary to Anderson, the Sketch does take the historical role of Christianity into consideration. Szűcs 
approaches the separation of the church and political power through a general separation of the 
spiritual and the secular world, claiming that this separation was an important prerequisite of 
modernity. This approach is close to the viewpoint of modernisation theories
29
 – though he 
characterised separation as a factor promoting liberty –, thus a typical motif of Western post-war self-
definition appears in the Sketch. Bibó embraced the ethical importance of Christianity. Yet this 
importance and its influence on social structures gets only a limited scope in Szűcs’s work – not unlike 
in those of Anderson’s.  
In his Sketch, Szűcs does not only concentrate on questions concerning the Middle Ages in 
Western Europe. Yet it is this stream of thought which brought a new perspective to explaining 
European history. All in all, his picture of the Middle Ages represents well that there is a way to 
integrate all typical Western motifs of post-war self-definition into one single theory. Firstly, the 
“liberty motif”, as a sign of “Europeanism”, developing them from medieval concepts of state and 
society and from a thorough analysis of economic and social structures.  Secondly, it also includes the 
opposite: development of empires, the concepts of “top-down” societies, originated partly from 
Weber’s works, as well as the separation of spiritual and secular matters found in modernisation 
theories. Finally, it incorporates the view which regards the first centuries of the new millennium as 
stages towards a modern age. 
Szűcs’s historical aspect was a typical intellectual product of the 1980s. Ambitions were still 
present then in Western social sciences to renew so-called “great theories”. Also, this was the time 
when some Central European historians started to outline Weberian aspects of social theory and 
categories of modernisation theories, concealing them with a Marxist terminology. 
 
                                                          
28
 Szűcs Jenő (1986): p. 524. 
29
 Especially on Niklas Luhmann.  
Bibliography: 
Anderson, Perry (1974): Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism, NLB, London 
 
Anderson, Perry (1974): Lineages of the Absolutist State, NLB, London 
Anderson, Perry (1989): Az abszolutista állam, Gondolat, Budapest 
Bibó István (1986): Az európai társadalomfejlődés értelme, in: Bibó István: Válogatott tanulmányok 
3. kötet, Magvető Könyvkiadó, Budapest, pp. 5-123. 
 
Bloch, Marc (1970): La société féodale, Michel, Párizs 
 
Bobbio, Norberto (é.n.): Az Európa-ideológia nagysága és hanyatlása, in: Kell-e nekünk Közép-
Európa?, Századvég - különszám, pp. 59-66. 
 
Brugmans, Hendrik (1965): L’idée européenne, De Tempel, Bruges  
Croce, Benedetto (1941): History as the Story of Liberty, Allen and Unwin, London   
 
Dawson, Christopher (1929): Progress and Religion, Sheed and Ward, London,  
Dawson, Christopher (1932): The Making of Europe, An Introduction to the History of European 
Unity, Sheed and Ward, London 
 
Dawson, Christopher (é.n.): Európa születése, Athenaeum, Budapest 
 
Dawson, Christopher (1948): Religion and Culture, Sheed and Ward, London  
 
Dawson, Christopher (1950): Religion and the Rise of Western Culture, Sheed and Ward, London 
 
Dawson, Christopher (1957): The Dinamics of World History, Sheed and Ward, London 
 
Dopsch, Alfons (1968): Wirtschaftliche und soziale Grundlagen der europaischen Kulturentwicklung, 
Scientia Verlag, Aalen 
Eisenstadt, Schmuel (1961): The Causes of Disintegration and Fall of Empires. Sociological and 
Historical Analyses, in: Diogenes, Vol. 9. No. 34. pp. 82-107. 
 
Eisenstadt, Schmuel (1969): The Political Systems of Empires, Free Press, New York   
Eisenstadt, Schmuel (2003): Comparative civilizations and multiple modernities, Brill, Leiden  
Fukuyama, Francis (2012): A politikai rend eredete, Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest   
Hajnal István (1936): Újkor, Egyetemes Történet 3. kötet, Magyar Szemle Társaság, Budapest 
 
Hajnal István (1993): Technika, művelődés. Tanulmányok, História, MTA Történettudományi Intézete, 
Budapest 
 
Halecki, Oscar (1950): The Limits and Divisions of European History, Sheed and Ward, New York 
 
Halecki, Oscar (1952): Borderlands of Western Civilization: a History of East Central Europe, The 
Ronald Press Co. New York 
 
Halecki, Oscar (1963): The Millenium of Europe, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame 
 
Halecki, Oscar (1993): Európa millenniuma, Századvég Kiadó, 2000, Budapest 
     Lakatos László (1992): “Középkorimádat” vagy népiesség? in: Valóság, 35/11, pp. 30-46.  
     Makkai László (1986): Az európai feudális rendszer genezise, működése és fejlődése, MTA TTI - OPI, 
Budapest 
 
Pirenne, Henri (1970): Mahomet et Charlemagne, Presses Universitaires de France, Párizs 
 
Pirenne, Henri (1983): A középkori gazdaság és társadalom története, Gondolat, Budapest 
 
Reynold, Gonzague de (1934): L’ Europe tragique, Spes, Párizs 
 
Reynold, Gonzague de (1941): Qu’est-ce que l’Europe? Éditions de la Librairie de l’Université, 
Fribourg                    
 
Reynold, Gonzague de (1944-57): La Formation de l’Europe, I-VII. LUF-Plon, Fribourg-Párizs 
Rosenstock-Huessy, Eugen (1949): The Driving Power of Western Civilization: the Christian 
Revolution of the Middle Ages, Beacon Press, Boston  
Rosenstock-Huessy, Eugen (1951): Die europäischen Revolutionen und der Charakter der Nationen, 
Europa Verlag, Zürich, Wien 
 
Szűcs Jenő (1983): Vázlat Európa három történeti régiójáról, Magvető, Budapest,  
 
Szűcs Jenő (1884): “Gentilizmus” A barbár etnikai tudat kérdése (Vázlat), in: Szűcs Jenő: Nemzet és 
történelem, Gondolat, Budapest, pp. 327-357. 
 
Szűcs Jenő (1985): Les trois Europes, L’Harmattan, Párizs 
 
Szűcs Jenő (1986): Vázlat Európa három történeti régiójáról, in: Berend T. Iván - Ring Éva (szerk.): 
Helyünk Európában II. Magvető Könyvkiadó, Budapest, pp. 515-568. 
 
Szűcs Jenő (1993): Az utolsó Árpádok, História, MTA Történettudományi Intézete, Budapest 
 
Wallerstein, Immanuel (1983): A modern világgazdasági rendszer kialakulása, Gondolat, Budapest 
 
Wallerstein, Immanuel (1992): Geopolitics and Geoculture, Essays on the Changing World-system, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
 
Wandycz, Piotr S. (1992): East European History and Its Meaning. The Halecki–Bidlo–Handelsman 
Debate. In: Jónás Pál – Pastor, Peter – Tóth Pál Péter (szerk.): Háború és társadalom. Király Béla 
Emlékkönyv, Századvég – Centum, Budapest, pp. 308-321. 
 Weber, Max (1979): Gazdaságtörténet, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest 
 
Weber, Max (1982): A protestáns etika és a kapitalizmus szelleme, Gondolat, Budapest 
 
Weber, Max (1992): Gazdaság és társadalom, 2/1. Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest 
 
